Despite the success of the Western Cape programme, problems remain. There are difficulties of sustainability, accountability and democracy in the programme's systems, as well as in its local, national and international governance. Treatment does not work for everyone; has sideeffects and may need to change periodically. It also produces fresh challenges in people's lives as HIV becomes a long-term but still-stigmatised and potentially fatal illness, with new implications for employment, family roles and sexual relationships. In epidemics where prevalence and incidence (annual new cases) remain high, as in South Africa, the economic future of ART is hard to guarantee without factoring in effective prevention; treatment's relation to prevention is also much debated.
Universal ART can have resource-diverting implications for other public services, particularly health, and for the voluntary sector. The successful scaleup technologies and discourses and practices of HIV citizenship described in this chapter do not circumvent the problems of 'development' Campbell adumbrates when discussing 'partnership' and 'capacity building'. Western Cape scaleup experiences also indicate that novel 'psychosocial' issues continually arise. Nevertheless, this chapter suggests that the Western Cape scaleup demonstrates the possibility of treatment technologies operating effectively in high-prevalence, low-resource contexts, as part of broader formations of HIV citizenship, pragmatically aligning effectiveness with medical and political hope.
The next sections of the chapter describe the context and nature of the scaleup, before examining the three technologies, and their current and future limitations
Anti-retroviral treatment: A 'universal' technology?
One of the UN Millenium Development Goals is to "combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases'' and halt HIV's spread by 2015 (http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/).
The UN, G8 and African Union pledge treatment and care for HIV to 80% of those who need it, and 25% reductions in HIV prevalence, by 2010. Three million people are now thought to be taking ART (World Health Organisation, 2008) , the most effective medical treatment for people with serious HIV illness -up from 400 000 in 2003 (World Health Organisation, 2006) . This medical treatment technology has powerful consequences, markedly decreasing HIV mortality and prolonging life. In the developed world, many HIV positive people are now living in their second decade of treatment. When treatment is generally available, people access it when they are healthier and more likely to do well (Boulle et al., 2008) . When HIV positive people on ART have unsafe sex, there is less likelihood of them transmitting HIV. When HIV positive women on ART have children, those children are less likely to have HIV (Jackson et al., 2007) . Expanded treatment also reduces the pandemic's psychosocial, economic and political effects -especially significant for high-prevalence epidemics in subsaharan Africa. By turning HIV from a fatal condition into a manageable, if difficult, chronic illness, ART reduces stigma (Wolfe et al., 2008) and enables disclosure (Skogmar et al., 2006 ) and this in turn encourages testing, and others' early, successful treatment (Chesney and Smith, 1999) . ART means less strain on health services, more people working, more parents looking after children, fewer orphans. It ameliorates the lives of some of the most disadvantaged people in the world. Its absence, and communities' resulting decimation by HIV, can lead to powerful social and political disaffection.
'Universal' ART provision is hard to attain. It is economically, institutionally and socially difficult to implement, and the pandemic, the virus, and treatment itself are uncertain and changing . ART is prohibitively expensive, particularly those second-line and later variants not available as generics, for high-prevalence low-and middle-income countries.
These countries are therefore positioned as perpetual aid recipients, sourcing a significant share of ART's cost from international donors such as PEPFAR and the Global Fund. As epidemics 'mature' and more people get ill, as new infection rates remain high, as HIV diverts or is perceived to divert resources from additional important health and other basic needs and as international NGOs backpedal on or struggle to meet -depending on your perspective -their universal treatment commitments, ART's sustainability is often questioned. ART is also said to be potentially enabling transmission by presenting HIV as a manageable chronic illness, untransmissible when treated (Davis, this volume) , turning it into a medicalised, technologically-determined condition, and obviating HIV prevention, without which the possibility of universal treatment recedes further.
An early objection to universalising treatment in developing-world epidemics was that complicated medications could not work for resource-deprived people, adherence would be poor and resistance would grow. However, adherence is higher in developing-than developed-world epidemics, and adherence-related resistance is low (Boulle et al., 2008) .
Another objection is that 'gold-standard' ART treatment programmes, medically on par with the developed world and providing 'wraparound' social services, are divisive resource misuse. As Lee (2006) , head of the '3 by 5' programme, notes against this westcentred criticism, such programmes are not viewed as over-provision in their own context. Similarly, the organisation Partners for Health, responsible for innovative HIV treatment in Haiti and Malawi, opposes dual-track care, suggesting treatment "should be both medical and moral…based on solidarity, rather than charity alone", involving "everything that the providers would do for their families -or themselves"
(http://www.pih.org/who/vision.html).
Do the difficulties of universal treatment mean that there will continue to be 'us' and 'them' HIV epidemics, distinguished by ART access and its lack? This chapter argues that we are living neither with two treatment-differentiated epidemics, nor in the 'postcrisis' situation described in some developed-world communities with treatment access (Rofes, 1998) but rather in a stage characterised by universalised HIV knowledge, including treatment knowledge, but uneven provision and expectations. This is still a 'treatment possibility' rather than a 'treatment' era. This stage nevertheless raises some common debates across the diversity of national epidemics, about how ART technologies, as well as HIV care, education and support technologies, are working, and how they could operate better.
Scaling up ART in a high HIV-prevalence province
South African addresses to treatment technologies are instructive to consider since the country has high prevalence -16% among adults (UNAIDS, 2008) -and more people on treatment than any other nation. Despite great economic diversity, South Africa is a middle-income nation, with relatively well-developed health services and infrastructure in urban and periurban areas. Today, between 28% and 42% of the approximately 900 000 people estimated to need treatment, are receiving it (World Health Organisation, 2008; Republic of South Africa, 2008) . In 2004, when the Western Cape province's ART scaleup began, there were no government plans to provide ART. In a reconstructing country faced with five million people dying from HIV-related illnesses within a decade, and with relatively good internal and external resources, treatment seemed to many both an ethical necessity and an economic and practical possibility.
In 2004, the Western Cape decided to make ART, previously restricted to a small number of sites, available to all the people in the province who needed it. Currently around twothirds of those thought to need ART in the province, are taking it. On conservative calculations, 72% of the first adult and 85% of the first child patients, many of whom started treatment when very sick and who came from a highly mobile periurban population, are still in the programme (Boulle et al., 2008) . Life expectancy when they started was at most one year.
At the beginning of scaleup, Western Cape HIV prevalence in the Western Cape was estimated at 200 000 -300 000 out of a 4.2m population (http://www.capegateway.gov.za/eng/your_gov/305). 10-20% needed ART according to WHO guidelines on treatment. HIV affects fewer people, proportionally (13%, from antenatal screening) and in absolute numbers, than in other South African provinces, because of the population's higher socioeconomic status and because the most HIVaffected, black-African community in South Africa constitutes a relatively small fraction of the Western Cape population. However, antenatal prevalence in some districts reaches 33%. The province's resources, better overall than those of others, are low in rural areas, posing considerable scaleup challenges in some heavily-affected districts. The health service suffers chronic understaffing, poor management and organisation, and lack of computerisation. There are eight million visits per year to clinics and four million visits per year to community health centres ; by 2010, 25% will be for HIV (Abdullah, 2004) .
Demonstration ART programmes at innovator sites had early success in the province in 2001 (Coetzee et al., 2004) , building on the succcess of Prevention of Mother-To-Child Transmission, or PMTCT, programmes which the provincial health department had begun in 1998. After court action by activists against the government, who said it would be unworkable and too expensive, these successful, cheap and popular PMTCT programmes rolled out nationwide, albeit slowly, from 2001 (Moodley et al., 2003) ; but PMTCT was accessible throughout the Western Cape by 2003. Currently, Western Cape transmission rates for HIV positive women are 6.1% (Draper et al., 2007) . The province's early-adopted and rolled-out PMTCT programmes formed an important treatment literacy foundation for patients and staff, particularly in the early stages of the ART scaleup. (Abdullah, 2004) .
Political technologies of scaleup
We might expect, from South Africa's political contests around HIV and the country's politicised recent history, that ART scaleup would involve political technologies: explicit contests over power relations. However, as the above description indicates, there were no explicit political alignments within the programme. Political commitment from national leaders, is often declared critical in tackling HIV epidemics, as in Uganda and Botswana (Epstein, 2006) . 
Administrative technologies of scaleup
The technologies of the scaleup can be understood as first of all administrative rather than political govermentality. The scaleup's managerial sophistication has often been noted as distinguishing it from other provinces' programmes (Abdullah, 2004; Beresford, 2004) . The province put special effort into working with pharmacological services on drug sourcing and distribution. Previous province health initiatives had not addressed these services, but they were key for a programme depending on a rapid increase, provincewide, in drug availability; on imported drugs involving complex ordering and processing; on low-supply, high-demand drugs liable to 'leak' from the system and on a treatment protocol opposed by government and therefore liable to experience national-level administrative delays. The province also instituted programme-wide 'basics first' monitoring of patient retention, progress, amount and rate of antiretroviral drugs used, and -via treatment waiting time guidelines -care quality. This thorough and painstaking monitoring required already hard-worked professionals to keep additional detailed handwritten records. More complex data were collected from 'sentinel' sites with electronic access (Boulle et al., 2008; Western Cape, 2007) . The data were powerful ripostes to arguments about the impossibility of making ART treatment work in generalised high-prevalence low-resource epidemics. Some procedures and data turned out to be unnecessarily cautious and detailed. Adherence and loss to followup, addressed and defined more strictly than in developed-world programmes, proved less than expected, and viral rebound rates have not been high (Boulle et al., 2008) . However, such 'overadministration' was a highly effective strategy, rendering the programme politically impregnable and building commitment to and confidence in it among patients and staff.
The politics of biocapital (Sunder, 2006) , an economic form dedicated to extracting surplus financial and epistemic value from the 'vital' properties of living organisms (Rose, 2007) , tends towards the minimum, quickest-achievable standards of administrative care, that will substantiate the value rather than the shortcomings of biological science. The administrative technology of this biocapital rollout was by contrast highly cautious and regulatory. It shared, however, one common characteristic of biocapital development: rapidity.
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Speed was important to reach people in this escalating epidemic; to try to reduce transmission through education and lower infectivity by treatment; to get treatment to people when they were at manageable numbers and before it was too late for them and to establish treatment structures for the larger numbers who would need them later. To achieve this, the programme's management structures had to be rapidly effective. From the beginning, they had to provide drugs consistently, and to sustain an infrastructure that would let drugs be prescribed and taken effectively, encouraging adherence and minimising the development of resistance. Speed was promoted by putting policy and planning targets into the annual budget: the budget itself became a scaleup tool. Often this involved informed approximations (Abdullah, 2004 From the beginning of the scaleup, resources were devoted to managing these partnerships so they could have rapid outcomes (Abdullah, 2006) . One cannot scale up quickly, alone.
The detail, breadth, and speed of the scaleup's administrative technology constituted a micropolitics of the epidemic. It set up participants in the scaleup -patients and staff -as citizens functioning within the HIV epidemic: as HIV citizens with specific means of ensuring access to and effectiveness of treatment. However, some of this technology's elements, for instance the strong collaborations which guaranteed its speed, were also components of other key technologies in the scaleup.
Partnership technologies
Technologies of partnership were central to scaleup. 'Partnership' is a problematic matter, rarely as easy to establish or as equal as it proclaims. It is often invoked in HIV and development discourse, where commitment to it can be a condition of receiving funding (Heywood, 2004) , but ignored or exploited in practice. Campbell's chapter provides many southern African examples of partnership discourse without practice. In other South
African provinces it has been questionably successful in supporting scaleup, particularly early on (Beresford, 2004) The Western Cape scaleup also generated examples of the 77 difficulties of national government, local government and civil society partnerships.
However, it demonstrated that is possible to build associations of different and differently powerful 'stakeholders' in limited, contingent partnership working for specific goals around HIV treatment. In the Western Cape, such associations were essential for operational reasons, to deliver the medical and 'psychosocial' aspects of HIV treatment within resource-constrained circumstances, as well as ideologically, to promote a "positive spiral…where all parties were working together to do their best" in a programme seen to be "innovative, responsive and inclusive" (Abdullah, 2004: 258) . However, scaleup could not rely on preexisting partnerships to deal with the numbers requiring treatment across the whole province. The Department of Health had to create a generalised technology of partnership across all levels and sites of medical engagement.
The scaleup devolves ART, often considered too complex and resource-intensive for primary health care environments, hence viewed as draining resources from and devaluing them, to precisely these environments, which are involved, too, in the programme's planning and monitoring. The scaleup's universal provision also lets primary-sector medical professionals address HIV much more effectively than before.
Pre-scaleup, they were often reported as stigmatising, unhelpful and fatalistic (Squire, 2007) . These reactions might be attributable partly to lack of treatment education (Beresford, 2004) ; partly to the 'deskilling,' frustrating and depressing effects of being unable to access proven effective treatment for fatally ill patients. In 2002, a doctor was fired from his government job for allowing prophylactic ART prescription to raped women. By contrast, the medical alliances promoted by the Western Cape scaleup support highly motivating partnerships in cutting-edge HIV treatment and care.
Partnership also extends to new professional groups. Pharmacists are specifically addressed as active scaleup partners (Naimak, 2006 Cape scaleup, the recognition of strong common interests between partners was promoted from the start through a concurrent public education programme, and peer education in schools, constructing the province's high levels of HIV cultural capital. Partnership is 83 also fostered by the programme's decentred processes, carried out by primary healthcare facilities, nurses, counsellors and NGOs clustered together within highly-affected neighbourhoods: everyone is close to the programme. Finally, perhaps most importantly, the promotion of treatment with education and prevention by the provincial health department, radically encourages partnership. HIV technologies that do not or cannot address the condition first as one that needs medical treatment, undermine their rationale by ignoring their own medical definition of their object, however much they are able to address other aspects of the condition.
The partnership-dependent delivery of ART, related prevention resources, and education for both treatment and prevention works horizontally and vertically, to develop social and cultural 'capital' (Campbell, 2003) within and across differently powerful groups: medical professionals; local politicians and officials; NGOs; CBOs; and community members who are patients, clients, service users and activists. These partnership-derived biosocialities of the epidemic are also part of a more broadly and actively articulated HIV citizenship, operating within and between these groups. For instance, drawing on ART programme partnerships, the Western Cape has supported campaigns against genderbased violence, a phenomenon linked to the epidemic in many ways (Jewkes, 2009) 
HIV treatment citizenship
The Western Cape scaleup deploys a technology of HIV treatment citizenship that is less explicitly planned than the other technologies and harder to measure or record, but that is frequently remarked on in commentaries on the programme (Robins, 2008) Much treatment education was informally pursued, not formally delivered. Given government criticism of ART as exploitative and toxic, knowledge of it had to be wrested 87 from competing sources of information. Patients' unexpectedly high levels of adherence often seems related to this self-educated engagement. Anecdotally, many clinicians report that people taking ART know the names of their drugs, alternatives available, and possible sideeffects, to a much greater extent than patients living with other chronic conditions such as diabetes and heart disease. Actively pursed, contested education thus seems a powerful aspect of the Western Cape's treatment citizenship, as it has been in elsewhere.
As is sometimes argued of Uganda (Epstein, 2006) , HIV began stabilising when many within the epidemic became active, educated 'HIV citizens.' In the Western Cape, this happened first in the treatment, rather than prevention, arena.
Educated treatment engagement has spread outward from the Western Cape, particularly to family members living elsewhere. For instance, in the group of those 'lost to (treatment) followup' in the scaleup, a term which might suggest uncommitted or disorganised patients, many show high treatment commitment, and treatment planning.
Some pregnant HIV positive women, for example, made their way to the Western Cape from other provinces with great difficulty, since they had no cash income for transport, to access its PMTCT programme, Other women and men, similarly cash-poor, came to the province to stay with family members and pursue their own treatment. Later, as treatment expanded for instance in the Eastern Cape, and as PMTCT babies were doing well, some patients returned home and thus were 'lost.' Currently, the scaleup's success means many patients feel free to move between medical facilities -moves which make care retention 88 statistics in a paper-based system, difficult to keep.
If treatment education was informal and contested, how did it work so well? The key route reported by Squire's (2007) Rabinow's (1996) formulation of 'biosocial' collectivities organised around contested biological subjectivities. There is a possible, though not inevitable, association between such sociality -which also helps constitute, for instance, the 'partnership' technology, described above -and the broader identifications and actions of treatment citizenship. Campbell and colleagues (2007) also specify that HIV competence involves owning the virus socially as 'our problem,' through the horizontal social-capital linkages described earlier as part of politicised partnership; and social effectivity. This account comes close to a Freirian programme for generating social change through collective critical dialogue (Freire, 1973) . Western Cape treatment protocols, from the demonstration projects on to the scaleup, clearly embedded citizenly ART understanding and effectivity within sociality.
They asked for NGOs, CBOs, and family and friends' involvement. Many required the participation of a familial or friend 'treatment assistant'. Building on the Western Cape demonstration projects, WHO ART scaleup guidelines also emphasise community and family support.
In ART scaleup discourse, therefore, people taking treatment, and their treatment assistants, are positioned as effective treatment citizens alongside medical professionals, forming contingent alliances with medical discourse, negotiating with it, disseminating this negotiated treatment knowledge socially, and negotiating with it further in the process (Robins, 2008) . This engagement is borrowed for public discourse, as it was in developing-world epidemics, from its earlier activist and community incarnations Epstein, 1996) . In the Western Cape, this discourse was at least partly effective in practice. The drive towards treatment literacy in advance of scaleup set up an important HIV sociality of people throughout the province, discussing ART in families and friendship networks as well as CBOs and NGOs. This sociality appeared in the early2000s concern of many people living around the demonstration and initial scaleup sites to 'speak out' about their status, and how one can live with and be treated for HIV as an illness, not as a sign of social or spiritual transgression (Squire, 2007) . The sociality of scaleup itself, institutionalised in decentred structure of local clinics' implemention strategies, allowed patients' groups and CBOs input into guidelines for starting and supporting treatment. These discussions migrated outward into broader family, friendship and community socialities. Such a socialised treatment citizenship technology seems now to extend across the province, and may be another factor contributing to the Western Cape's high HIV test rates, and the rise in sexual debut age in the province (Flisher et al., 2006 ) -something often said to be associated with the plateauing of other highprevalence epidemics (Epstein, 2006) .
Treatment citizenship could be seen as a kind of 'capacity building.' Campbell is rightly sceptical about this process, describing it as fatally self-undermining. Generally, efforts at building treatment citizenship technologies, or Campbell's broader category of HIV competence, try to correct resource inequities by transferring resources defined by those that have them, who also decide how they shall be transferred and when they have been successfully moved over. Such programmes' understanding of power differences is undercut by their re-performance of these differences precisely while combatting them.
The contested nature of politics (Mouffe, 2005) is acknowledged in analysis, erased in implementation. In the case of the Western Cape scaleup however, the technology of treatment citizenship was to a large extent defined, appropriated and developed by the people requiring it.
Treatment citizenship is not equivalent to HIV citizenship in general, but its technology may build that broader formation. We have seen how the province's prevalent forms of treatment citizenship seem associated with high levels of HIV testing, and changes in sexual relationship patterns. In addition, Western Cape treatment citizenship generated, and continues to support, jointly-developed campaigns by medical professionals, NGOs and CBOs, for cheap access to key license-protected drugs; but also NGOs' and CBOs' development of support services, for instance around gender violence. CBOs' involvement in treatment education has led to stronger prevention and education programmes, an integration of great concern to people of all statuses in South Africa. We have suggested that the Western Cape ART scaleup can be analysed as working through a triad of administrative, partnership and citizenship technologies, built up from near-zero in some places and cases, to high and largely self-sustaining levels. The scaleup technologies were not necessarily or exactly connected with people's development of a wider HIV citizenship; they had some independent fields of action. However, it is clear that they contributed to the constitution of this broader HIV citizenship within the province. These technologies can be worked with in other contexts, but crucial to their effectiveness has been their recognition of factors that must be addressed locally. Such particularity, instantiated in the scale-up's commitment to neighbourhood-developed strategies, renders the technologies resistant to exact translation.
The technologies also present substantial problems of contemporary and future implementation, derived from their own heterogeneities and contradictions, as well as from those that appear in their relation with other, medical social and political technologies.
The limits of scaleup technologies
Throughout the scaleup, its technologies have encountered a number of resistances, some of which are likely to persist and strengthen. The scaleup has not made HIV citizens of the 20 000 people estimated to be HIV positive and to need treatment, who are not accessing it. Partial explanations for this may lie, as mentioned earlier, in the limitations of the programme's administrative technology, particularly in health service resources reaching their limits. In addition to the general programme, the health department is now targeting the specific local problematics of HIV in relation to older men, schoolchildren, sex workers and truck drivers. The scaleup may also have encountered a geographic limit in reaching people who can access clinics by walking or by car; many rural settlements are not served by roads. As people live longer, the complications of longterm ART use become more common, more people progress to ART, increasing numbers move onto expensive second-and third-line drug regimes, and incidence remains high, problems will multiply. Men, who have little contact with South African health services, are consistently underrepresented in treatment at 30% of the total -though more women are HIV positive (Boulle et al., 2008) . Women continue to face gendered stigmatisation and disclosure difficulties (Ratele and Shefer, 2002; Rohleder and Gibson, 2006 ). HIV's dramatic impact at diagnosis and its stigmatisation persists, in South Africa and globally (Flowers, this volume; Stevens and Hildebrandt, 2006) . Acknowledging the condition, disclosing (Flowers, non-medical technologies that we have described were key to scaleup's successs.
Administrative and partnership technologies were formulated and implemented with relative autonomy from the medical technologies of ART. Even treatment citizenship, the technology most focussed on medicine, configured health information in terms of activism and social dialogue, and had important associations with broader forms of HIV citizenship.
Conclusion
How will the Western Cape programme's scaleup technologies fare in future? The plan is to double enrolment yearly for the next five years, particularly focusing on underrepresented men. As more patients stay on therapy, more will move to expensive second-line drugs. Numbers of people requiring treatment will continue to rise well into the next decade and beyond, if numbers of new cases do not fall (Western Cape, 2006) .
The resourcing of such extensive treatment, even given generic provision and domestic manufacture, will be a growing concern. The psychological, social and political consequences for large fractions of the population living long-term with difficult medical treatment are hard to predict. Achmat and Simcock (2007) are optimistic about the ameliorative effects of longterm treatment combined with prevention, education and community mobilization -the wider HIV citizenship technologies discussed above. Draper and cowriters (2007) call for largescale and thoroughgoing initiatives that do not look qualitatively different from those currently operating. The citizenship, administrative and partnership strategies discussed here, may, despite their limitations, be able to address at least some of the future conditions of this epidemic, and perhaps of others.
